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COMMENTS
THE LESSONS OF THE LAW: SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND BAEHR V. LEWIN
I. THE OLD LESSON
A. Why Does It Matter
In November 1983, a drunk driver struck Sharon Kowalski's car.
Sharon, then twenty-seven years old, suffered severe brain damage and
debilitating physical injuries. Obviously, she was unable to act on her
own behalf; someone needed to be appointed her guardian.1 Luckily,
Sharon had a loving committed partner of four years. Sharon and her
partner, Karen Thompson, had exchanged rings, purchased a house, and
had named each other as beneficiaries in their life insurance policies.'
Ordinarily, a person's spouse undertakes to act on the other's behalf
under such circumstances. However, at the hospital, Karen Thompson
was treated as a stranger, denied visitation rights, and made to wait sev-
eral hours before being told that Sharon was still alive. Thereafter,
Sharon's parents arrived. Upon discovering Karen and Sharon's rela-
tionship, Sharon's parents petitioned a court for guardianship and the
right to determine visitation, denying Karen all access to their daughter.
During Karen's last allowed visit, Sharon typed (she was unable to
speak), "[H]elp me. Get me out of here. Take me home with you."3 The
two would not see each other again for three and one-half years.
4
Currently, no state recognizes same-sex marriages, despite the
United States Supreme Court's repeated assertion that marriage is a fun-
damental right.' Marital status carries with it numerous economic and
1. Mary N. Cameli, Note, Extending Family Benefits To Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 68
CH.-Knrr L. R v. 447,452 (1992).
2. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Ste-
reotypes, and Legal Protections for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 511, 581
(1992).
3. Id. at 582.
4. 1d. Karen Thompson spent $125,000 in legal fees and went to court more than 20 times
before she was named guardian in 1991. Id. See In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d
790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
5. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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symbolic benefits. Married couples gain favorable tax treatment, intes-
tate succession rights, employer health coverage, and Social Security en-
titlements. They also receive legal benefits such as spousal
communication privileges, hospital and jail visitation rights, and the abil-
ity to authorize emergency medical treatment.6
Further, marriage is much more than a civil contract authorized by
the state. "It is the centerpiece of our entire social structure, the core of
the traditional notion of 'family.' ,17 Ultimately, this debate is not about
joint tax returns or health insurance; it is about the lesson the law
teaches. By denying gay and lesbian couples access to the "sacred"8
union, society proclaims them less worthy, less committed, insignificant.9
B. Substitutes; or Lesser Equality
Gays and lesbians have demonstrated the resiliency and strength of
their commitments through a myriad of legal devices that attempt to
mimic the benefits of marriage that they are denied.
1. Legal Instruments
Some of the legal benefits of marriage can be replicated by executing
wills, contracts, trusts, or powers of attorney.10 Such instruments may
ensure that property will pass to the partner at death," that medical and
financial decisions will be made by the partner in case of incapacitation,
and that common property will be shared after a dissolution.' 2
6. James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation
Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 96 (1993).
7. Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LEsBIANs, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAW 398, 400 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) [hereinafter Rubenstein].
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
9. Some have argued that same-sex marriages will aid in securing social acceptance for
gays and lesbians. Alma G. Lopez, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing American Family,
and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 347,352 n.21 (1993). Professor
Richard Mohr has asserted that "[s]ociety currently makes gay coupling very difficult: a life of
hiding is a tense and pressured existence not easily shared with another ... If discrimination
ceased, the energies that the typical gay person wastes worrying in the closet would be re-
leased for" personal flourishing and societal benefit. RcHARD D. MoHr, GAYs/JUsTIc E: A
STUDY OF ETIcs, SocmTY AND LAW 44 (1988).
10. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 431.
11. If a partner in a couple dies intestate, the surviving partner ordinarily will not be
entitled to any portion of the decedent's estate. See, e.g., In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d
684 (Sup. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed mem., 82 N.Y.2d
801 (1993).
12. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 431.
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In Whorton v. Dillingham,3 a California appellate court, following
the lead of Marvin v. Marvin,4 upheld an oral agreement made by a gay
couple to share equally all property acquired during the relationship.
The court found that any sexual services called for in the agreement
were severable from the rest of the contract, which was enforceable.'
More importantly, the court recognized that agreements between un-
married same-sex partners are often indistinguishable from those be-
tween unmarried heterosexual couples.' 6
Nevertheless, even when courts enforce cohabitation agreements,
these contracts only protect the couple against each other; they extend
no benefits in the public realm. They are no aid in gaining employment
benefits, provide no protection for inheritance, afford no power to act
for a partner in a medical emergency, and give no ability to provide fu-
neral arrangements for a deceased partner.17
Although durable powers of attorney and wills evade some of the
preceding difficulties, cohabitation agreements are also more likely to be
challenged than similar documents executed by heterosexuals. For ex-
ample, where a beneficiary and testator were involved in a gay or lesbian
relationship, charges of undue influence are common, even though there
is no evidence such influence occurs with greater frequency among
same-sex couples.'
2. Adult Adoption
Since every state recognizes the inheritance rights of the adopted
child of an unmarried intestate decedent, some gays and lesbians have
sought to adopt their partners in order to secure legal sanction for the
relationship.
However, the availability of adult adoption varies from state to state.
Some jurisdictions prohibit adult adoption completely;' 9 others expressly
13. 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
14. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that unmarried co-habitants may contract to share
property acquired during the relationship).
15. Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
16. Id.; Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. Rnv.
1508, 1625 (1989) [hereinafter Developments]. The Georgia Supreme Court has also ruled that
a contract between two lesbian partners is enforceable. Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga.
1992).
17. Cameli, supra note 1, at 461. For gay men whose partners suffer from AIDS, these
denials of "medical" rights can be devastating. See Fajer, supra note 2, at 581.
18. Cameli, supra note 1, at 463-64. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence
and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. Ruv. 225 (1981).
19. Developments, supra note 16, at 1626.
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allow it.2° Still others permit only certain kinds of adult adoption a.2  For
a number of reasons, most courts have been reluctant to allow the adop-
tion of adults who are not wards of the state. First, adoption has tradi-
tionally been viewed as a mechanism to protect the well-being of a
child.'a Second, with few exceptions, adult adoptions are irrevocable.
While a married person can always disinherit the other spouse through
divorce, an adoptee continues to be the adoptor's legal heir forever, un-
less he or she is adopted by someone else.23 Finally, adult adoption does
nothing to help gain the employment and tax benefits available to
spouses and dependents.24
3. Domestic Partnerships
Several municipal governments have passed domestic partnership or-
dinances as an alternative legal status that can be conferred upon non-
traditional families.2 - A domestic partnership has generally been
defined as two people who are committed to each other and have de-
cided to share their lives in an intimate familial relationship. Partners
must register with their municipality, which usually entails filing an affi-
davit declaring the creation of a partnership and paying a nominal fee.26
While certainly a step forward, domestic partnership ordinances fall
far short of the protections afforded by marriage. Unlike marriage, do-
mestic partnership does not provide tax benefits, inheritance rights, or
dissolution procedures. No state legislature recognizes domestic part-
nerships. Should the couple decide to leave their present city, any bene-
fits accrued through their registration will not travel with them. Further,
even in those few cities recognizing the relationship, the benefits offered
are only guaranteed for city employees; it is left to the discretion of pri-
vate employers whether they will offer similar benefits to their employ-
ees and their employees' partners.27
20. Id. at 1626-27.
21. Id. at 1627.
22. Id.
23. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 447. In Succession of Bacot, 502 So. 2d 1118 (La. Ct.
App.), cert denied, 503 So. 2d 466 (La. 1987), a former partner who had been adopted actually
challenged a later will. Further, in most states, the adopted partner loses the right to inherit
from his or her natural parents. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 447.
24. Cameli, supra note 1, at 465 n.140.
25. Lopez, supra note 9, at 358. These cities include: Los Angeles, Berkeley, West
Hollywood, and Laguna Beach, California; New York City and Ithaca, New York; Seattle,
Washington; Madison, Wisconsin; and Takoma Park, Maryland. Id. at 358 n.54. The benefits
provided usually include sick/bereavement leave and health benefits. 1d. at 358 n.55.
26. Id. at 358 n.54.
27. Id. at 358 n.55, 359.
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Domestic partnerships are available to both same-sex and different-
sex partners. Perhaps the "lower" level of protections afforded to heter-
osexual couples can be justified-they could always wed and thereby
enjoy the entire spectrum of legal, economic, and social benefits that
inhere in that union. Same-sex couples have no such choice.
Of all the devices examined above, none comes close to the status of
marriage. Thus far, prejudice has prevented gays and lesbians from en-
joying the same freedoms, protections, and rights as heterosexuals.28
The time has come to recognize the worth of all intimate relationships.
Part II of this comment will marshall the constitutional arguments for
allowing same-sex marriage, as well as critically examine the cases that
have denied this right. Part III will then analyze Baehr v. Lewin,29 a
recent case in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the state's
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples must withstand "strict
scrutiny," the highest constitutional test.30 Since very few statutes can
meet this standard, it is believed that Hawaii may become the first state
to recognize same-sex marriages. Working on that assumption, Part IV
will analyze the possible conflict of laws issues that will inevitably arise
when one state allows a marriage that others deny.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
Marriage regulation is traditionally the domain of state legislatures.31
However, marriage laws, like all laws, must pass constitutional muster.32
Two aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment come into play when consid-
ering the validity of marriage regulations: due process and equal protec-
tion. Under the Due Process Clause, personal rights that can be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," are in-
cluded in the guarantee of personal privacy.33 These fundamental rights
28. The degree of hostility towards gays and lesbians is beyond the scope of this comment.
See generally Jeff Peters, When Fear Turns to Hate and Hate to Violence, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 22
(1991); MaryAnn Dadisman, Roots of Hate: Homophobia at Its Source, 18 HUM. Rrs. Q. 24
(1991) (presenting research that shows homophobia is similar to racial prejudice).
29. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), clarified, recons. denied, in par4 remanded, 74 Haw. 645, and
recons. granted, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (1993).
30. Id. at 68.
31. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
32. Trosino, supra note 6, at 95.




may be limited only in the furtherance of a compelling state interest, by
means necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve the objective.'
Review under the Equal Protection Clause occurs under one of three
tiers. Garden-variety social or economic legislation is presumed valid,
and the classifications drawn will be upheld if rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest.35 The general rule will give way, however, when
classifications are drawn along lines of race,36 alienage, or national ori-
gin.37 These schemes will be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny; that is,
they must be necessary to further a compelling state interest.38 Legisla-
tion that classifies along gender lines is subjected to "intermediate scru-
tiny," meaning it must be substantially related to the furtherance of an
important state interest.39 Finally, legislation that affects a "fundamental
right" is also subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.n°
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the free-
dom to marry is among a person's basic civil rights.4' Several recent
cases have hinted that constitutional protection may be forthcoming for
gays and lesbians, at least where the legislation serves no purpose other
than discrimination.42
1. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
In Meyer v. Nebraska,n3 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a state law prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English
in any public or private grammar school. In so holding, the Court stated:
[The liberty interest guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely the freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
... and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
34. Id. at 155.
35. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
37. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
38. Id.
39. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
40. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate migration), over-
ruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (access to the courts).
41. See cases cited supra note 5.
42. See infra part II.A.2.
43. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free [people]. 44
In 1942, the Court decided Skinner v. Oklahoma,45 in which it struck
down that state's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.46 Finding that the
legislation ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court, speaking
through Justice Douglas, stated: "We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procre-
ation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."47
In 1965, the Supreme Court began to state more forcefully what had
been mere dicta in previous decisions: Marriage was a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution.' In Griswold v. Connecticut,49 the Court
struck down a statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives by mar-
ried people.50 More important, the Court for the first time defined a
"zone of privacy""1 that protects individuals from governmental intru-
sion. Marriage, "intimate to the degree of being sacred," was firmly en-
trenched within that zone.52
In the 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia,53 the Court considered the
constitutionality of Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, which prohib-
ited all marriages between "a white person and a colored person. ' 54 The
Court recognized that marriage was a "social relation subject to the
State's police power"; however, that power was limited by the Four-
teenth Amendment.55 The Court then held that the statute was uncon-
stitutional under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The State argued that the laws should be
upheld, as they applied equally to both participants in the proscribed
union-white and "colored. '56 Rejecting this argument, the Court
stated that the appropriate equal protection inquiry was "whether the
44. Id. at 399.
45. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
46. Id. at 538.
47. Id. at 541.
48. Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning
Scriptura Canonica4 and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. L.J. 173, 194(1992).
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Id. at 480, 485.
51. Id. at 485.
52. Id. at 486.
53. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 8. This argument was accepted by the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583(1882).
1994]
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classifications drawn by [the] statute constitute an arbitrary and invidi-
ous discrimination. '57
Concluding that the anti-miscegenation statutes rested solely on im-
permissible racial distinctions, the Court applied the "most rigid scru-
tiny" to the laws." "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification. 59
The Court also held that this statute violated the Due Process
Clause.60 The Court's reasoning, although applied to race, is also appli-
cable to the issue of same-sex marriage.61 "To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embod-
ied in these statutes ... is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of
liberty without due process of law."62 The Court concluded that "[t]he
freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.163
For years the states had considered it unthinkable that persons of
different races would marry, just as today many states prohibit same-sex
marriage on purely historical or definitional grounds.6' The Court in
Loving demanded more than mere prejudice as a justification for legisla-
tion prohibiting certain persons from marrying.
In 1978, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Wis-
consin statute that precluded divorced Wisconsin residents with minor
children not in their custody, and whom they were ordered to support,
from remarrying without first obtaining a court order certifying that they
had fulfilled their support obligations.65 The Court, in Zablocki v.
Redhail,6 6 struck the statute on equal protection grounds, stating that
"the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals." 67
The Court, in critical language, further held that "reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
57. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Trosino, supra note 6, at 107.
62. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
63. Id.
64. See infra Part lI.B.
65. Friedman, supra note 48, at 195-96.
66. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
67. Id. at 384.
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relationship may legitimately be imposed. '68 Outright prohibitions of
same-sex marriages certainly fail the Zablocki mandate.
The Court firmly established that marriage is a fundamental right,
implicating both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in Lov-
ing and Zablocki. These cases represent two major constitutional devel-
opments. The first was toward protecting intimate adult unions from
prejudice. Thus, Loving held that states could not proscribe inter-racial
unions. The second development was the removal of unreasonable bur-
dens on an individual's right to marry. Thus, in Zablocki, the Court
struck a statute that tied the right to marry to a person's wealth.69 De-
spite these holdings, the ultimate burden remains in place for gay and
lesbian couples desiring the benefits, protections, and status of legal
marriage.
2. Class Analysis
The Supreme Court has never considered gays and lesbians a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. In fact, given the Court's
holding in Bowers v. Hardwick,70 it may be more appropriate to con-
clude that gays and lesbians are legally disfavored.71 In Bowers, the
Court held that states may constitutionally proscribe consensual, homo-
sexual sexual activity, stating, "[T]here is no such thing as a fundamental
right to commit homosexual sodomy."72 The Court held that the right to
privacy enunciated in previous cases did not apply to Michael Hardwick
because there was "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procre-
ation.., and homosexual activity.- 73
In many states, discrimination against gays and lesbians does not end
with the illegality of their intimate relations. Gays are subject to vio-
68. Id. at 386 (emphasis added). For a discussion of direct or substantial as compared to
indirect or insubstantial restrictions on the right to marry, see Friedman, supra note 48, at 199-
202, where the author argues that only a direct interference with the right to marry will trigger
strict scrutiny review.
69. Developments, supra note 16, at 1605-06.
70. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that states may constitutionally proscribe consensual,
homosexual sex).
71. Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia still have statutes criminalizing sod-
omy. Those states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 80.
72. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id. at 191. Bowers has been widely criticized elsewhere, thus I will not detail its fail-
ings here. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Search-
ing for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
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lence and harassment based simply on who they are. A recent study
found that over ninety percent of gays and lesbians had been victimized
in some form because of their sexual orientation. 74 "Greater than one in
five gay men and nearly one in ten lesbians had been punched, hit, or
kicked; a quarter of all gays [have] had objects thrown at them... ."75
At its most extreme, prejudice against gays and lesbians takes the form
of queerbashing, a type of anti-gay violence in which groups of young
men target someone they perceive to be gay. These groups stalk, attack,
and often beat the perceived gay individual into unconsciousness, while
hurling taunts and slurs.7 6 Professor Richard Mohr has drawn an anal-
ogy between queerbashing and the lynchings of blacks-both serve to
stigmatize an entire group.77
Gays have also been subjected to discrimination in employment. Few
among the general populace realize that gays and lesbians can be, and
often are, fired simply based upon their sexual orientation.78 Ironically,
government may be the biggest discriminator of all. "The federal gov-
ernment explicitly discriminates against gays in the armed forces, the
CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency, and the state department.
The federal government refuses to give security clearances to gays,"
thereby forcing defense contractors to fire openly gay personnel in sensi-
tive positions.79 Further, "State and local governments regularly fire gay
teachers, police and fire personnel, and anyone who has contact with the
public."8
Given the pervasive discrimination suffered by gays and lesbians, sus-
pect class status may be appropriate. 81 However, we may not need to go
74. MOHR, supra note 9, at 27-28.
75. Id. at 28.
76. Id. Even worse, the courts often tacitly condone this violence. "In 1984, a District of
Columbia judge handed suspended sentences to queerbashers whose victim had been stalked,
beaten, stripped at knife point, slashed, kicked, threatened with castration, and pissed on,
because the judge thought the bashers were good boys at heart - after all they went to a
religious prep school." Id. Police often discount assaults on gays. All the attacker need do is
claim he was provoked by a sexual overture. Id. at 28-29.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id. at 30. But see infra note 144.
79. Id.
80. Id. The federal government's proffered reason for denying security clearances is the
possibility of blackmail, which could occur if "enemy agents" learn the sexual orientation of
someone in a sensitive position and use it against him or her. This is, in large part, a circular
and self-created fear. If the government did not discriminate against gays and lesbians there
would be little to "hold over" homosexual employees.
81. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had declared homosexuals a suspect class in Wat-
kins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cit. 1988). However, the court subse-
quently granted rehearing sitting en banc, Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1362 (9th
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that far. Many of the schemes that discriminate against gays and lesbi-
ans cannot survive even minimum rationality review. Denial of same-
sex marriage could be similarly scrutinized.
In Meinhold v. United States Department of Defense,' a sailor had
been discharged from the service after admitting he was gay on a televi-
sion program. Meinhold sued the Department of Defense, alleging dep-
rivation of his equal protection rights. The court, applying the rational-
basis test, granted Meinhold's motion for summary judgment, perma-
nently enjoining the department from "discharging or denying enlist-
ment to any person based on sexual orientation in absence of sexual
conduct which interferes with the military mission. 83
Refusing to merely defer to the military's judgment, which is inher-
ently subjective and not scientifically verifiable, the court was unable to
conclude that the military's policy on gays and lesbians furthered any
permissible goal.84 The court cited numerous studies commissioned by
the Department of Defense that found no relation between sexual orien-
tation and military performance. Rather, the policy was based on false
stereotypes, similar to those which had undergirded racial segregation of
the armed forces.8 5
Another recent case held that the military's policy on gays and lesbi-
ans violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.86
In Cammermeyer v. Aspin,87 the District Court ordered the reinstate-
ment of an army nurse who had been dismissed upon admission of her
sexual orientation.88
Cir. 1988), and affirmed on other grounds, refusing to reach the constitutional issues. Watkins
v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir, 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). Gays
and lesbians exhibit many of the traditional characteristics of suspectness: immutability, de-
rogatory stereotyping, historical discrimination, and political disadvantage. Lopez, supra note
9, at 373.
82. 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd and vacated in part, 34 F.3d
1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
83. Id. at 1458. The Supreme Court stayed the order as applied to others than Meinhold,
pending review by the Court of Appeals. Meinhold v. United States Dep't. of Defense, 114 S.
Ct. 374 (1993). The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the order as applied to Meinhold, but re-
versed and vacated the opinion as applied to others. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1479-80.
84. Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. at 1457.
85. Id. at 1457-58.
86. Equal protection law binds the federal government, just as it does the states, by "re-
verse incorporation" through the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
87. 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
88. Id. at 929.
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The court relied heavily on the cases of Palmore v. Sidoti89 and
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.90 In Palmore, the United States
Supreme Court overturned a state court's decision to remove a woman's
child from her custody after she remarried a black man, stating that the
law could not give effect to the prejudices of third parties.91 Of course,
that case implicated racial classifications and was decided under strict
scrutiny review.'
However, the logic of Palmore was extended to rational-basis review
in Cleburne. There, the city denied a special use permit to a group home
for retarded people.9 3 The Court refused to hold that the mentally re-
tarded constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class, yet found an equal
protection violation nonetheless.9 4 The denial was based purely on prej-
udice, stereotypes, and irrational fears-not any of the city's proffered
reasons (safety, property values, etc.).95 The court in Cammermeyer
adopted a similar analysis. "A cardinal principle of equal protection law
is that the government cannot discriminate against a class in order to
give effect to the prejudice of others. '9 6 Finding that the military's pol-
icy was based on irrational fears and stereotypes, the court held that it
was not rationally related to any legitimate goal.97
The analogy to same-sex marriage is clear. If states cannot advance
reasons for their denial beyond mere historical prejudice, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause has been violated.
Finally, in Evans v. Romer,98 the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of
Colorado from enforcing its controversial voter-initiated amendment to
the Colorado Constitution (Amendment Two). The amendment stated
that no protected status would be afforded based on homosexual, les-
bian, or bisexual orientation.99
The trial court held that Amendment Two "may burden fundamental
rights of an identifiable group," namely, the "right not to have the State
89. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
90. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
91. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
92. Id. at 432.
93. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
94. Id. at 446-47.
95. Id. at 450.
96. Cammermeyer, 850 F. Supp. at 926.
97. Id.
98. 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
99. Id. at 1272. For an interesting discussion of the circumstances surrounding the passage
of Amendment TWo, see Bella Stumbo, The State of Hate, Esouina, Sept. 1993, at 73.
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endorse and give effect to private biases."' Since fundamental rights
were implicated, the court engaged in strict scrutiny review and con-
cluded that the plaintiffs had shown a reasonable probability that
Amendment Two would be found unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt at a trial on the merits. 01
On review, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that homosexuals did
not constitute a suspect class. Nevertheless, the Equal Protection Clause
"applies to all citizens."'" The court went on to analyze the plaintiffs'
equal protection claim upon different grounds than the trial court. It
held that Amendment Two infringed upon the "fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process and that any attempt to in-
fringe on an independently identifiable group's ability to exercise that
right is subject to strict scrutiny review."' 0 3
Citing Hunter v. Erickson,04 the court wrote that "a State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation on its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote."105
Protection of fundamental rights, such as political participation (or mar-
riage) is available to all citizens, not only members of suspect classes.0 6
The court concluded that Amendment Two clearly affects the right to
participate equally, "because it bars gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
from having an effective voice in governmental affairs insofar as [they
may seek legislative protection] from discrimination based on their sex-
ual orientation."'0 7 By "fencing out" a clearly identifiable group from
the political process for no compelling reason, Amendment Two ran
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 0 8
100. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1273-74. The trial court cited Palmore v. Sidoti in support of this
conclusion. Id. at 1274 n.5.
101. I& at 1274.
102. I& at 1275.
103. Id at 1275-76. The court relied on the "voting" cases: see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); the "reapportionment" cases: see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); and the
"access to the ballot" cases: see, eg., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), to formulate this
fundamental right to political participation. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(striking down an amendment to the California Constitution that abolished fair housing laws
aimed at protecting blacks).
104. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (involving a voter referendum in the city of Akron, Ohio that
made it more difficult to enact fair housing ordinances).
105. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1283.
106. Id at 1284.




The analogy to same-sex marriage is clear. By denying a fundamen-
tal right, whether it be marriage or political participation, to an identifi-
able group, whether suspect or not, a state denies that group the equal
protection of the laws.
B. Denials of Same-sex Marriage
Given the preceding constitutional analysis, it would appear that
states would be required to advance compelling, or at least rational, rea-
sons for their denials of same-sex marriage licenses. Marriage is a funda-
mental right. Further, the Equal Protection Clause requires a
justification for legislation beyond mere prejudice. Set out below are
several cases which held that gays and lesbians may not marry their part-
ners, advancing the "traditional" reasons for that denial.
Many courts simply argue that individuals of the same sex cannot
marry because of the definition of marriage itself - one man joined with
one woman.10 9 In Jones v. Hallahan,"0 two women sued to compel a
county clerk to issue them a marriage license. After finding that the
marriage statutes did not specifically preclude same-sex unions, the court
examined three dictionaries and concluded that marriage had tradition-
ally been defined as the "union of a man [and] a woman.""' The wo-
men were not being prevented from marrying by the statutes (or on the
basis of invidious gender discrimination), "but rather by their own inca-
pability of entering into marriage as that term is defined.""' 2
In Baker v. Nelson," 3 the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that
"[i]t is unrealistic to think" the original draftsmen of the state's marriage
statutes, "which date from territorial days," would have construed them
to allow same-sex unions."' "The institution of marriage as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of chil-
dren within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."" 5
In Singer v. Hara,116 the Washington Court of Appeals followed the
"logic" of Jones and Baker. Marriage consisted only of a man and wo-
man, the primary purpose of which is procreation. "[T]he refusal of the
109. Friedman, supra note 48, at 188.
110. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
111. Id. at 589.
112. Id.
113. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
114. Id. at 186. The residents of "territorial" Minnesota would likely be shocked at many
modern practices, such as racial integration and women in the workforce.
115. Id.
116. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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state to authorize same sex marriages results from [the] impossibility of
reproduction .... "I The court dismissed the challengers' claim under
Washington's Equal Right's Amendment (ERA) by determining that
they were not being denied a marriage license because they were of the
same sex, but rather "because of the nature of marriage itself."118
The logic of these cases, and similar cases," 9 is wholly circular: same-
sex couples cannot marry because what they represent is not marriage.
This reliance on the traditional notion of family belies both reality 20 and
recent constitutional developments.12 1 For centuries it was unthinkable
that a white person would "debase" himself or (certainly) herself by
wedding a person of color."a Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in
Loving violated the traditional concept of marriage relied upon in the
cases discussed above. The court in Singer evaded the Loving rationale
by simply claiming that what same-sex couples propose is not marriage.
Further, the court held that there was no violation of Washington's ERA
"so long as marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female
pairs."'" In Loving, the State unsuccessfully made an identical argu-
ment: the anti-miscegenation statute should be upheld because it denied
marriage to whites and blacks "equally." Of course, that logic is superfi-
cial, glossing over the racial animus which undergirded the statute.
In Baker, the court distinguished Loving in a thoroughly disingenu-
ous manner, claiming that case was decided "solely on the grounds of its
patent racial discrimination."'1 4 Clearly, Loving meant more; it held
that marriage was a fundamental right, which could not be denied "on so
unsupportable basis as the racial classifications embodied in these stat-
117. Id. at 1195.
118. Id. at 1196.
119. See e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1991),
in Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 418; DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984);
Both cases denied marriage licenses to gay men. Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), dismissed an action by two women seeking to compel the county clerk to issue
them a marriage license.
120. As of 1991, barely one in five families fit the traditional definition of family (hetero-
sexual two-parent, bread-winner father and home-maker mother). Lopez, supra note 9, at 350
n.11.
121. See, eg., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (endorsing an ex-
panded definition of family). See also Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding that a deceased tenant's gay partner was "family" for purposes of rent control laws).
122. See generally Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding a statute proscribing
adultery or fornication between a white person and a Negro), overruled in part by McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
123. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191.
124. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
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utes."' Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion has broader implica-
tions for statutes restricting marriage; a state cannot deny the
individual's choice of a marital partner based purely on prejudice. The
Baker court transposed Justice Stewart's terse concurrence 126 with the
real holding of the case.
The procreation arguments forwarded by these courts are similarly
superficial. Different-sex couples are not required to produce children;
nor are those couples incapable of procreating without a marriage li-
cense. a7 Further, Griswold and its progeny afforded constitutional pro-
tection to such intimate decisions as "whether to a bear or beget a
child."' 8 If the only valid purpose of marriage was procreation, all the
decisions concerning birth control were wrongly decided.
Three other major justifications have been advanced for the denial of
same-sex marriages. First is the view that homosexuality is contrary to
"natural law," an affront to "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards. 1 12 9 Christians often cite the book of Leviticus, where it is written:
"If a man lies with a male as a woman, both of them have committed an
abomination."' 3 ° The destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah is commonly
viewed as evidence of God's wrath against homosexuals. 13
The Biblical "evidence" may not be so clear. Christ never mentioned
homosexuality. Further, those who cite the Old Testament to condemn
homosexuality do so by reading selectively. 32 Leviticus is filled with
"rules" such as: do not eat rabbits, do not eat pigs, do not sleep with
another man, do not eat finless water creatures, or do not remain near
an "unclean woman." Which of these edicts are staunchly observed to-
125. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
126. Justice Stewart's one paragraph opinion simply stated it is "not possible for a state
law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the
race of the actor." Id at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Marks v. Marks, 77 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (holding that an inability
to procreate cannot be grounds for preventing people from getting married).
128. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
130. Leviticus 20:13.
131. Genesis 18-19. However, some have argued that the destruction of these cities was
due to the inhospitality of the citizens, not homosexual behavior. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRIS-
TIANrry, SociAL TOLERANCE, AND HoMosExuALrry 92-98 (1980). In Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. 1992), a presbyterian minister testifying for the defendant in
a sodomy prosecution opined that Biblical references to homosexuals were not indictments,
"but rather statements against aggression, inhospitality, and uncaring relationships."
132. MOHR, supra note 9, at 33.
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day? Or are those who condemn homosexuality mean-spirited hy-
pocrites (themselves often the object of Christ's denunciations)? 133
Regardless, the biblical debate is outside the realm of law. As Justice
Blackmun noted in his Bowers dissent, "The legitimacy of secular legisla-
tion depends.., on whether the State can advance some justification for
its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine."'134 If states seek to
deny same-sex couples the benefits and protections of their marriage
laws on religious grounds, they run headlong into the Establishment
Clause.135 States must look elsewhere for their justification.
Second, states may argue that same-sex marriage can be proscribed
based upon general majoritarian moral preferences-religion aside. Af-
ter all, are not all laws, at some level, based on moral choices? 136 The
majority view, expressed through duly elected state legislatures, is that
gay and lesbian couples should not be allowed to marry, or in many
states, engage in private, consensual sexual activity. Bowers v. Hard-
wick 137 represents the latter.
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down that state's
sodomy statute in Commonwealth v. Wasson.'38 The particular statute
punished "deviant sexual intercourse with another of the same sex."'139
The court proceeded along a two-prong analysis, concluding that the
statute ran afoul of the Kentucky Constitution's guarantees of privacy' 40
and equal protection of the laws.14' Its opinion thoroughly punctured
the "majoritarian morality" justification.
133. i& These edicts are found in Leviticus 11:1-47, 15:19-47.
134. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . .. ." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. I. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (requiring that legislation
have a secular purpose, a neutral effect, and avoid excessive entanglement with religion).
136. Laws prohibiting homicide certainly reflect the moral determination that killing is
wrong.
137. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
138. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
139. Id. at 490.
140. Id. at 491. The court relied upon § 2 of the Kentucky Bill of Rights in its privacy or
individual liberty analysis. "Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property
of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority." Id. at 494. The
court held that the guarantees of individual liberty provided by the Kentucky Constitution
exceeded those of the Federal Constitution as enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court. IM. at 491.
141. IdM at 492. Section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution states: "All men, when they form
a social compact, are equal ... ." Id. at 491. As Bowers failed to address the equal protection




Under the due process or privacy prong, the Wasson court noted that
morality is an evolving concept. After chastising the United States
Supreme Court for its "misdirected application of the theory of original
intent" in Bowers, the court pointed to Loving, where "a contemporary,
enlightened interpretation of the liberty interest" struck down the anti-
miscegenation statute, despite the fact that it was "highly unlikely that
protecting the rights of persons of different races to [marry] was one of
the considerations behind the Fourteenth Amendment.""14
As evidence of the "moral evolution" in the present context, the
court noted that in 1961 all fifty states outlawed sodomy, whereas in
1992 barely half continued to do so.14 3 "[O]ur decision, rather than be-
ing the leading edge of change, is but a part of the moving stream."'"
The court bolstered its privacy analysis by quoting from Commonwealth
v. Bonadio,14 5 wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down
that state's sodomy statute.
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power [should not
be used] to enforce majority morality on persons whose conduct
does not harm others.... [N]o significant state interest justifies
legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is followed
by a number of people, or even a majority.146
The court concluded that society had undergone vast changes in its
sexual morality. With adultery, fornication, and deviant sexual inter-
course no longer considered crimes among heterosexuals, the state had
no basis for declaring this type of sexual "immorality" more destructive
142. l at 497.
143. lId The court gleaned these statistics from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193-94
(1986).
144. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498. This "moving stream" has swept with it more than sod-
omy laws. Seven states (California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia have adopted laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment and housing on the basis of sexual orientation. Rubenstein,
supra note 7, at 270. Courts are beginning to recognize gay and lesbian relationships in some
circumstances. See, e.g., Crooke v. Gilden, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992) (enforcing contract be-
tween two lesbians); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that gay
partner was "family" for purposes of rent control laws); Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal Rptr.
405 (Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing contract between gay men). See also In re Adoption of Evan,
583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sup. Ct. 1992). There, the court allowed a lesbian couple to adopt the
biological child of one of the partners. The court stated: "Here this Court finds a child who
has ... two adults dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and determined
to raise him to the very best of their considerable abilities." Id. at 1002.
145. 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980). The court also cited People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980), wherein the high court of New York struck down that state's sodomy statute.
146. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,50 (Pa.
1980)).
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to family values, warranting criminal punishment.147 In fact, the allow-
ance of same-sex marriage would further the state's interest in family
cohesion and stability among a previously excluded segment of the
citizenry.
As an alternative basis for its holding, the Kentucky Supreme Court
also invoked the equal protection component of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion.148 Relying on an opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Watkins v. United States Army, 49 the Wasson court recognized that the
Due Process Clause typically protects deeply rooted traditions and prac-
tices. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, however, "is not to
protect traditional values and practices, but to call into question such
values and practices when they operate to burden disadvantaged minori-
ties.... Equal protection simply requires that the majority apply its val-
ues even-handedly."''5 Same-sex marriage asks no more than this;
competent, adult gays and lesbians seek that same legal status long con-
sidered a birthright of heterosexuals.
More fundamentally, this type of "morality" is flawed. It maintains
that the allowance of same-sex marriages may encourage "deviant" prac-
tices,' 5 ' implicitly endorsing the homosexual "lifestyle" as a legitimate
"choice."' 52 This argument presupposes two unsupportable theories.
The first theory assumes that sexual orientation is merely a choice, de-
cided on a whim. Two recent studies by highly respected scientists point
to a genetic or biological basis for sexual orientation. 53 More pragmati-
cally, how many people would choose a life of either secrecy or abuse? 15 4
147. Id at 501.
148. Id. at 499.
149. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
150. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 499 (quoting Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,
718, 720 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)).
151. Sodomy laws remain in effect in 23 states and the District of Columbia. See supra
note 71.
152. Trosino, supra note 6, at 110.
153. See Dean H. Hamer, et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome
and Male Sexual Orientation, SCruNCE, July 16, 1993, at 321; Simon Levay, Beyond Belief. Are
Homosexuals Born and Not Made?, Tim GuARDIAN, Oct. 9, 1992, at 31 (discussing the au-
thor's discovery of a difference in the hypothalamus in the brains of homosexual and hetero-
sexual men). Laura Allen and Roger Borski of the University of California at Los Angeles
have also reported a difference in the brains of gay and heterosexual men, specifically in the
anterior commissure, the pathway connecting the left and right hemispheres of the cerebral
cortex. Id. Cognitive scientists have shown that gays and lesbians differ in a variety of percep-
tual and behavioral traits-such as verbal skills and left or right handedness-most easily
explained in terms of different prenatal development. Id See also Doreen Kimura, Sex Differ-
ences in the Brain, Sm. AM., Sept. 1992, at 118.
154. See generally MoHR, supra note 9, at 44.
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The second assumption is that homosexuality is an inferior orientation,
something to be discouraged or "cured."'1 55 Gay and lesbian relation-
ships are capable of the same love, caring, compassion, and respect as
heterosexual unions. 56 It is these elements that determine the value of a
relationship, not ancient texts or current stereotypes. 57
Finally, a state may argue that homosexuality should be discouraged
at every turn in order to protect children, certainly a legitimate interest.
This justification fails in its selection of means, however. Once again,
this argument is based on irrational stereotypes and prejudice. The fear
of gays and lesbians as'sexually deviant predators of children is totally
unfounded. In fact, children are less likely to be molested by a homosex-
ual adult than by a heterosexual adult. 58 Further, many studies have
shown that gay and lesbian parents are just as capable of parenting as
heterosexual parents,'159 and the children raised by gay and lesbian par-
ents are no more likely to be homosexual than children raised by hetero-
sexual parents.161 In short, gays and lesbians are no greater threat to
children than heterosexuals.
155. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of mental
disorders in 1974. See William A. Henry III, Born Gay?, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 36 (stating
that immutable traits cannot be "cured").
156. Trosino, supra note 6, at 109.
157. See generally Fajer, supra note 2. Through studies and interviews, Fajer shows that
gay and lesbian relationships evince the same warmth, love, and familiarity as heterosexual
relationships.
158. See Friedman, supra note 48, at 209; Trosino, supra note 6, at 110-11; William B.
Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and
Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. & POL. 89, 101 n.36 (1991) (citing VINcENT DE FRANcis, PROTECr-
ING THE CHILD VICnM OF SEX CRIMES CoMMITTED By ADULTS 216-17 (1969) (stating that
97% of sex offenders against children are male and 90% of victims are female)).
159. Developments, supra note 16, at 1636-57; David J. Kleber, et al., The Impact of Pa-
rental Homosexuality in Child Custody Cases: A Review of the Literature, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & LAw 81 (1986). See also In re the Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Sur.
Ct. 1992) (discussed supra note 146). Many courts have ignored the empirical evidence and
held that gay and lesbian parents are per se unfit. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 492. See eg.,
Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) ("the father's continuous exposure of the child to
his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of
law."). Others have held that the nature of homosexuality will expose the child to community
hostility. Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 492. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510
(Ark. Ct. App. 1987); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981). But see Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that the law cannot give effect to private biases).
160. Trosino, supra note 6, at 111; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay
Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1036 (1992) ("There is no evidence to suggest that psychosocial
development among children of gay men or lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to
that among offspring of heterosexual parents."). With approximately three million gay men
and lesbians raising eight to ten million children in this country, Rubenstein, supra note 7, at
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I have attempted to outline the constitutional bases for allowing
same-sex marriages, while exploring the circular, unpersuasive logic of
its opponents. Until 1993, no court had deviated from the traditional
view. Then the Hawaii Supreme Court decided the case of Baehr v.
Lewin.' 6'
III. BAEHR v. L._EwIN; THE PENDULUM SWINGS
On May 1, 1991, six plaintiffs filed a complaint in Hawaii Circuit
Court challenging that state's marriage statute,16 which explicitly re-
ferred to "man and woman."' 63 The trial court granted the state's mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the plaintiffs' action with
prejudice for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted. 64
On appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the plaintiffs averred that
application of section'572-1 to deny same-sex marriage violated the right
to privacy, as guaranteed by Article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitu-
tion, 65 as well as the equal protection and due process clauses found in
Article I, section 5 of the same.166 The court analyzed each claim in turn
before concluding that the circuit court's order "runs aground on the
shoals of the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection clause," vacating
the judgment and remanding the case for further proceedings.167
A. The Right to Privacy
The framers of the Hawaii Constitution inserted the right to privacy,
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in cases such as Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,16 Eisenstadt v. Baird,169 and Roe v. Wade,'170 di-
475, perhaps the Bowers court erred in concluding there is "no connection between family...
and homosexual[ity]." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
161. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), clarified, recons. denied, in par remanded, 74 Haw. 645,
and recons. granted, in part, 875 P.2d 225 (1993).
162. HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (1985).
163. HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-1(7) (1985).
164. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48.
165. Id. at 50. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps
to implement this right." HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6.
166. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the
enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof be-
cause of race, religion, sex or ancestry." HAw. CoNST. art. I, § 5 (1978).
167. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54.
168. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
169. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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rectly into that document, in Article I, section 6. When construing that
section, the Hawaii Supreme Court has been guided by the cases of the
United States Supreme Court. 7' Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court be-
gan its analysis in Baehr with the United States Supreme Court cases
construing marriage as a fundamental right.172
After reviewing the federal "marriage" cases, the court concluded
that the "federal construct of the fundamental right to marry. .. pres-
ently contemplates unions between men and women.' 1 73 While ac-
knowledging that it could give broader privacy protection under
Hawaii's own constitution, the court felt compelled to follow the lead of
the United States Supreme Court. Applying what it perceived to be the
present federal privacy standard, the court concluded that the right to
same-sex marriage is not so deeply "rooted in the traditions and collec-
tive conscience of [the] people that failure to recognize it would violate
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice."174
B. Equal Protection Review
The court began by stating that the "equal protection clauses of the
United States and Hawaii Constitutions are not mirror images of one
another." 7  The more elaborate Hawaiian version provides that "no
person shall... be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be de-
nied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ances-
try."'1 76 The court then concluded that section 572-1, on its face and as
applied, regulated access to the marital relationship on the basis of sex.
Since the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection guarantee is "broader"
than that of the United States Constitution, the court held that classifica-
tions based on sex are subject to strict scrutiny, 177 rather than the inter-
mediate scrutiny mandated in Craig v. Boren.78 Under this standard,
the court ruled that section 572-1 "is presumed to be unconstitutional,"
unless the state can show that it is justified by a compelling state interest
170. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
171. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55.
172. Id at 55-56. The court analyzed Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
173. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56.
174. Id at 57.
175. Id at 59.
176. Id at 60.
177. Id at 67.
178. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitu-
tional rights.'79
The court, while commendably jettisoning the Singer court's con-
struction of the sex discrimination and ERA issue, seemed a bit too ea-
ger to avoid the realities of the case. The plaintiffs were only
incidentally denied marriage licenses on the basis of gender. The real
motivation behind these statutes, as the court certainly realized, was not
gender discrimination, but homophobia. Thus, while the result is lauda-
ble, a better rationale is provided by the Colorado Supreme Court in
Evans.80 Plaintiffs were denied the exercise of a fundamental right, in
this case marriage, based solely on their membership in a disfavored
class. As the courts in Meinhold' 18 and Cammermeyer' z also noted, the
Equal Protection Clause protects all citizens from legislation based
purely on antiquated stereotypes or irrational prejudice. Under any
standard of review, a court should strike down legislation resting on
these impermissible bases.
C. The Concurrence
The judgment of the court discussed above was a mere plurality of
two. The third vote necessary to reverse the lower court's ruling was
provided by Justice Bums, who articulated his views in a peculiar
concurrence.18 3
Justice Burns agreed that the circuit court erred in granting judgment
on the pleadings, as the case involved genuine issues of material fact,
namely "to what does the word 'sex' refer" in the Hawaii Constitu-
tion.' s4 In his view, sex included all the aspects of gender that are "bio-
logically fated."'8 5 Noting several studies that indicated homosexuality
may be biological, 86 as well as several commentators who disagree, the
Justice concluded that the matter should be returned to the trial court
for fact-finding. If sexual orientation is "biologically fated," the "Hawaii
Constitution probably bars the State from discriminating against the sex-
179. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
180. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
181. Meinhold v. United States Dep't. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993),
aff'd in par4 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
182. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
183. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68 (Burns, J., concurring). The Hawaii Supreme Court is com-
prised of five justices.
184. Id. at 68-69 (Burns, 3., concurring).
185. Id. at 69 (Burns, J., concurring).
186. Although the Justice did not elaborate, he appeared to be referring to the DNA and
brain region studies discussed in note 155, supra.
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ual orientation difference by permitting opposite-sex Hawaii Civil Law
marriages and not permitting same-sex Hawaii Civil Law Marriages."'"
If sexual orientation is not "biologically fated," the state may "en-
courage heterosexuality and discourage homosexuality" through its mar-
riage laws. 88
As noted earlier, a growing body of scientific evidence has indicated
that sexual orientation is at least partially inherited by the individual.' 89
Nevertheless, proving this theory in a court of law seems unlikely. The
Justice unnecessarily injected a scientific argument into a case his breth-
ren in the plurality had disposed of in a purely legal, thoroughly rational
(if simplistic) manner. One can only hope the litigants in the trial court
follow the plurality's lead and leave this issue to the scientific
community.
D. The Dissent
The dissent in Baehr resurrected the same tired definitional or tradi-
tional "argument"' 90 that was used in prior cases to deny same-sex mar-
riage.' 9' The plurality rightly called this argument an "exercise in
tortured and conclusory sophistry.""g In a bald denial of all that Loving
v. Virginia'93 taught, the dissent stated "HRS sec. 572-1 treats everyone
alike and applies equally to both sexes."' 94 Of course, so did the anti-
miscegenation statute, punishing both white and black partners in the
"illicit" union.'9 5 Concluding that this statute should be reviewed under
the rational basis test, the dissent approved the state's proffered interest
in creating a "desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of chil-
dren."' 96 This assertion ignores the fact that no decision has ever pre-
vented infertile different-sex couples from marrying, or required those
capable of having children to do so. In fact, the Hawaii legislature spe-
cifically removed a section from the state's family code that required
marriage applicants to show they were not impotent. 97 The dissent
quickly glossed over the legislature's statement that this provision was
187. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69-70 (Bums, J., concurring).
188. ki. at 70 (Bums, J., concurring).
189. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
190. Same-sex couples cannot marry because what they represent is not marriage.
191. See supra part II.B.
192. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
193. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
194. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71.
195. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
196. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 72-73.
197. Id at 74 n.9.
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"narrow and outdated"'198 by asserting, without explanation and only
within a footnote, that this "characterization should not be expanded to
include the applicants in this case."'199 Even more damaging to the
state's argument is the fact that the available empirical data indicates
that same-sex couples provide as good a forum for the raising of children
(whether from a previous union, adoption, or artificial insemination) as
heterosexual couples.2 00
Finally, the dissent predicted "far-reaching and grave repercus-
sions"201 from the decision, pleading for judicial restraint in an area
properly left to the legislature.2° However, it has always been the prov-
ince of the courts to invalidate legislation contrary to the Constitution.20 3
Courts cannot ignore violations of constitutional rights due to fear of
social or economic upheaval.214 Gays and lesbians may not be socially
accepted, 05 and the extension of "benefits" to them may raise the ire of
certain segments of the citizenry. 2 °6 Still, judges may not give effect to
private prejudices.207 Gays and lesbians have been denied a fundamen-
tal right based purely on their sexual orientation. Baehr v. Lewin is the
first step in rectifying this historic injustice.208
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 159-60.
201. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 74.
202. Id.
203. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
204. See e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (ordering the state of Texas to provide
free public education to the children of illegal aliens); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pro-
viding a broad right to choose an abortion despite vocal public opposition); Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (busing); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (ordering an end to segregated public schools). All of these
cases involved controversial and/or costly issues, yet the Supreme Court refused to shirk its
constitutional duties in response to those pressures.
205. See ag., James D. Wilson, Gays Under Fire, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1992, at 34, 37
(noting a recent poll that found 58% of the respondents opposed to legal same-sex marriages).
A 1991 Gallup poll of white Americans found that 45% disapprove of interracial marriage,
while 44% approve. Trosino, supra note 6, at 93 n.2. These bigoted attitudes do not change
the fact that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), is still the law of the land. They should not
carry the day in the area of same-sex marriage either.
206. Groups in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, and Wash-
ington are seeking to pass constitutional amendments denying legal protections for gays and
lesbians. See Stumbo, supra note 99, at 74. Given the result in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993), wherein Colorado's amendment was struck down, these efforts may be doomed
to failure.
207. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
208. The decision in Baehr has created a backlash from conservative groups in Hawaii. In
newspaper ads, opponents of same-sex marriage warned that the decision could unleash the
"wrath of God" and perhaps another hurricane. Deb Price, Hawaii Leads Movement for Gay
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IV. CONFLICTS ANALYSIS; WILL OTHER STATES VALIDATE?
One commentator on same-sex marriage has written: "If gay and les-
bian marriage is legitimized in any state, other states would be forced to
recognize gay marriages conducted in that state through the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution."2 9 Unfortunately, this is not nec-
essarily the case. Gays and lesbians who "flocked to the state that would
marry them"21 may well find their union denied recognition when they
return to their home state.
Under Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution, a state
must accord full faith and credit to the public acts and judicial decrees of
other states. Thus, a state court must accord the divorce decree of a
sister state full recognition, provided that state had proper jurisdic-
tion.211 Nevertheless, as the Wisconsin Attorney General has stated:
"This in no way means that one state can impose its legislation or prac-
tices on a sister state with respect to matters which are properly within
the jurisdiction of the sister state. '21 2 Thus, the determination as to
"who shall occupy the matrimonial relationship within its borders" rests
with the state. 3 The full faith and credit clause provides no barrier to
one state denying the validity of a marriage celebrated in a sister state.
However, states almost always validate marriages contracted else-
where, based upon the policies contained in their family codes, or the
notion of comity. As a general rule, a marriage valid where celebrated is
valid everywhere, subject to two exceptions. First, if the marriage is ex-
pressly prohibited by a local statute, it will be denied recognition. Sec-
ond, if the marriage is contrary to strong public policy, morality, and
decency, it will likewise be deemed invalid. 4
This common law rule has given way in many states to statutory gov-
ernance. Some states have enacted marriage validation statutes, which
compel state officials to recognize any marriage valid where celebrated.
Other states have enacted marriage evasion statutes, which render inva-
Marriages, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 4, 1994, at C7. The Hawaii House of Representatives has held
hearings on two bills aimed at retaining the ban on same-sex unions; one would amend the
state constitution. Across the U.S.A.: News from Every State, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 1994, at
7A. The final ruling on Baehr from the trial court is expected in 1995. Price, supra, at C7.
209. Cameli, supra note 1, at 477.
210. Id at 478.
211. See, e.g., Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364,368, 162 N.W. 312,313 (1917);
55 Op. Att'y. Gen. Wis. 240, 242 (1966).
212. 55 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. at 243.
213. Id at 244.
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFncr OF LAWS § 283 (1971); EUGENE F.
ScOLES & PETER HAY, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 13.5 (1982).
[Vol. 78:121
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND BAEHR V. LEWIN
lid any marriage celebrated outside of the state that could not be con-
tracted within the state. This section will analyze these statutes, their
significance for same-sex couples married outside of their state of domi-
cile, as well as some possible results in those states adhering to the com-
mon law rule of recognition.
In order to prevent the discussion from being swallowed by a myriad
of conflict of laws principles, this section will be limited in two ways.
First, it will only address the validity of marriage, specifically, whether
the two individuals are lawful spouses. No discussion of the incidents of
marriages, nor the formalities of celebration will occur. 15 Second, it will
only discuss same-sex couples that leave their state of domicile, travel to
a state that will lawfully marry them (i.e. Hawaii), then return to their
state of domicile.
The state where the couple was domiciled prior to their marriage and
to which they intend to return subsequent to it has the most significant
relationship to that couple. 6 To date, marriages have only been invali-
dated when in violation of the strong public policy of the state of domi-
cile. Regardless of the forum, or the state of celebration, the law of the
state with the most significant relationship to the couple will usually be
applied." 7 Thus for the purposes of this comment, assume the state of
marital domicile will apply its laws, including any evasion or validation
statutes, as well as the specific provisions of its family code.
A. Marriage Validation Statutes
Section 210 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides: "All
marriages contracted.., outside this state, that were valid at the time of
the contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which
they were contracted or by the domicil [sic] of the parties, are valid in
this state. '218
Currently, twelve states have statutes which are similar to this one in
effect.21 9 It would seem at first blush that same-sex couples traveling out
215. The issue of marital validity could arise in an action for annulment or a declaratory
judgment action as to the marriage's existence. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTI._cr OF
LAws § 283 cmt. a. (1971).
216. Id. cmt. c.
217. Id. cmt. k.; Wmius L.M. REESE, ET AL., CoNFLicr OF LAWS 829 (9th ed. 1990).
218. REESE, ET A.., supra note 219, at 829.
219. These states are: Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 1993)); California
(CAT. FAM. CODE § 308 (West Supp. 1994)); Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-2-112 (1989));
Hawaii (HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-3 (1985)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1983)); Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-115 (1981)); Kentucky (Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Baldwin
1989)); Nebraska (NEB. RFv. STAT. § 42-117 (1993)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-4
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of their state to be wed could return to these states as their marital domi-
cile. However, several factors militate against over-confidence.
1. Is This "Marriage"?
Recall that several courts have held that same-sex couples cannot
marry because what they represent does not comport with the definition
of that term.220 A court considering whether to validate a same-sex
union may simply decree that, although they have been commanded to
recognize foreign marriages by the legislature, this union does not con-
stitute an actual marriage. In fact, the courts in California and Colorado,
for example, could find statutory support for such a holding. In both
states, the general definition of a civil marriage contains the terms "man
and woman."
2. Illegal Consummation
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia still have sodomy
statutes on their books.22 What would be the result in Idaho or Kansas,
for instance, when a court required to validate a same-sex marriage
would tacitly sanction a criminal act? One of the conflicting policies
contained in these two types of statutes would have to fall, unless the
state decides to validate only celibate same-sex unions. This would al-
most be a parody of the Clinton administration's new "don't ask, don't
tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.
3. Contrary Holdings
Finally, the state of Kentucky, which has a validation statute, 2 was
also the state where Jones v. Hallahan223 was decided. The Jones court
held that two women could not marry because they failed to satisfy the
definition of marriage. Could a court in Kentucky recognize an out-of-
(Michie 1978)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. § 25-1-38 (1992)); and Wyoming
(Wyo. STAT. § 20-1-111 (1987)). While several of these statutes are not based on the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, and refer to marriages celebrated in other countries, all apply to
marriages contracted in others states as well. It should also be noted that Kentucky has specifi-
cally proscribed same-sex marriages by judicial decision, Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d (Ky.
Ct. App. 1973), while Utah has enacted a specific statutory ban. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-
2(5) (1994). On March 1, 1995, in specific response to Baehr, the Utah legislature changed
their marriage validation statute to an evasion statute. See David W. Dunlap, Some States
Trying to Stop Gay Marriages Before They Start, N.Y. TiMEs, March 15, 1995, at A18.
220. See supra part II.B.
221. See supra note 71.
222. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Baldwin 1989).
223. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
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state marriage that was expressly denied to inhabitants of that state in
1973?'- However, as discussed earlier, the Kentucky Supreme Court
struck down that state's sodomy statute in 1992.15 Perhaps the strong
public policy against homosexuality in Kentucky has waned.
B. Marriage Evasion Statutes
As indicated, the presence of a marriage validation statute would not
appear to guarantee a same-sex couple recognition of their union. Simi-
larly, in the fourteen states that have some sort of marriage evasion stat-
ute, 2 26 the result does not appear to be preordained. There are two
general types of evasion statutes. The first type is exemplified by the
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, which states that if any person "prohib-
ited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state" travels to
another state and marries there, "such marriage shall be null and void
for all purposes in this state."' 7 These statutes would appear to spread a
blanket ban over all marriages that could not be contracted within that
state, and are, in some form, in effect in seven states?3
The courts in most states have not passed on the issue of same-sex
marriage,2 9 and only a few proscribe it by statute.230 Thus, a court asked
224. Id This same dilemma could confront the courts in Utah, which proscribe same-sex
unions via statute.
225. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
226. These states are: Arizona (ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-112 (1991)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-28 (West 1986)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 104
(1993)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-43 (1991)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-6-6
(Bums 1987)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 91 (West 1981)); Massachusetts (MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 10 (West 1987)); Mississippi (MISs. CODE ANN. § 93-1-3 (1994));
New Hampshire (N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 457:43 (1992)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
3-101 (1991), as construed in Rhodes v. McAfee, 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970), invalidates any
marriage violative of this consanguinity provision)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5
(1993)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-40 (Michie 1990)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 48-
1-17 (1992)); and Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (West 1993)). The District of Colum-
bia also has an evasion statute. D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-105 (1993). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 5, para.
213 (1989) validates marriages contracted elsewhere unless contrary to public policy. Since
this seems a mere codification of the common law rule, it has not been counted among the
evasion statutes.
227. REFSE, ET AL., supra note 217, at 830.
228. These states are: Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 104 (1993) voids marriages "prohibited by
this chapter" of the family code. Thus, while not specifically enumerated, Delaware's law does
not appear to be a true blanket ban either. It should also be noted that New Hampshire has
enacted a specific statutory ban on same-sex marriage. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:1
(men) and § 457:2 (women) (1993).
229. For a list of those states whose courts have directly confronted the issue, see supra
part lI.B and note 119.
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to validate a same-sex marriage contracted outside that state may be
forced to pass on the question of whether such a union would be prohib-
ited inside the state. A progressive court in a state that has not specifi-
cally answered this question could validate same-sex marriage,
notwithstanding the existence of a stern marriage evasion statute, by
simply holding that no law had been evaded.
The second type of evasion statute is more specific. It holds that
marriages contracted elsewhere in order to evade a certain provision of
the state's laws are void. For example, West Virginia has a statute that
prohibits the evasion of its consanguinity provision by traveling to an-
other state to marry?231 These enumerated statutes are typically con-
cerned with evasion of the state's prohibitions against incest and
polygamy, as well as their age requirements; none of these statutes spe-
cifically mention same-sex unions.23 2
Thus, in these states, the evasion statute is theoretically no barrier to
the recognition of same-sex marriages. However, the courts in these
states could still refuse to validate on public policy grounds, evoking the
old common law rule. However, they would not be statutorily required
to do so.
C. The General Rule
The existence of marriage evasion and validation statutes does not
necessarily preordain the result for a same-sex couple married outside
the state. In those states that adhere to the general rule of recognition,
the results could be even more unpredictable.
1. The First Exception
Some states have specifically denied same-sex couples the right to
marry in their family codes.233 It seems extremely unlikely that a court
in these states could validate a same-sex marriage. Recall that the first
exception to the general rule, that a marriage valid where celebrated is
valid everywhere, is a specific statutory prohibition. Although few states
ban same-sex unions outright, most use the words "man and woman" or
"male and female" in their codes. For a court seeking a rationale for its
230. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 (1993).
231. W. VA. CODE § 48-1-17 (1994) prohibits leaving the state to intermarry in violation
of § 48-1-2, "What Relatives a Man May Not Marry."
232. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-7-6-6 (Bums 1987). Indiana specifically bans same-
sex marriages in § 37-7-1-2, yet, its enumerated evasion statute does not list this ban.
233. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 1993); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.01
(West 1993).
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denial of recognition, these scattered references in the statutes could
provide all the backing necessary.
2. The Second Exception
The rights of gays and lesbians have long been denied on the basis of
public policy, morality, and decency. Courts could quite easily deny rec-
ognition of same-sex unions solemnized elsewhere under this exception,
reciting the litany of procreation, child protection, and decency argu-
ments relied upon for generations.
Two competing policies permeate marriage validation analysis. First
is the justified expectations of the parties, who would ordinarily expect
the validity of their marriage to be governed by the local law of the state
where it was contracted.3 4 Second is the legitimate public concern of
the state wherein the couple will reside3 s5 Given the nature of this mar-
riage, a court may find the couple's expectations unrealistic. Obviously,
an intentional decision was made to leave the state in order to escape its
laws. Same-sex marriages have been universally denied. It could not be
argued that the couple was ignorant of the reasons for its flight, or seri-
ously expected quick and easy validation.
However, the interest of the state must also be tempered by constitu-
tional limitations. As we have seen, the ability of a state to regulate the
marital relationship is not unlimited. A same-sex couple facing a chal-
lenge to the validity of their marriage should confront the state's argu-
ment that they had no expectation of recognition with a constitutional
rebuttal. The state's interest here is based upon impermissible stereo-
types and prejudices; it should not be allowed to trump the interest of
the couple in the sanctity of their union.
V. A NEW LESSON
If Hawaii does decide to allow same-sex marriage, the ideal response
from other states would be to follow suit by amending their family
codes. z 6 However, this domino effect is extremely unlikely. Alterna-
tively, those couples who "flock" to Hawaii to wed could become the
234. R=ESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNir.icr OF LAWS § 283 cnt. b (1971).
235. Id.
236. Representative Tammy Baldwin (D-Madison) has said she will soon introduce a pro-
posal in the Wisconsin legislature to permit same-sex marriages in that state. Joanne Wein-
traub, Activist Denounces Move To Legalize Gay Marriages, MiLWAUKEE J., Feb. 11, 1994, at
B7. Reverend Lou Sheldon of the Traditional Values Coalition called the proposal a "social
reign of terror," equating same-sex marriage with "inner-city violence, drugs and crime" as
destroyers of the traditional family. Id. State wide domestic partnership legislation is being
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs in judicial challenges to discriminatory marriage statutes across
the nation. An action for a declaratory judgment that their marriage is
valid may be more persuasive than a simple challenge from unwed same-
sex partners.
In any event, Baehr v. Lewin could be to the gay and lesbian commu-
nity what Brown v. Board of Education23 7 was to African-Americans. It
is well known that Brown signaled an end to racial segregation in Ameri-
can schools. But more importantly, it meant that discrimination against
blacks would no longer be countenanced. The symbolic importance far
out-stripped its actual holding. It signified a nation in evolution, one
now prepared to deliver on its promise of emancipation and equal pro-
tection of the laws. Brown provided hope. In the years that followed,
African-Americans secured those rights long considered the birthright of
whites.
Brown taught all Americans that black schoolchildren were every bit
as worthy as white schoolchildren. The status of the two races was
equalized through integration. Similarly, by allowing gay and lesbian
couples to marry, and enjoy that status long considered "one of the basic
civil rights of man, '2 38 the law will finally teach Americans that same-sex
couples are every bit as worthy as different-sex couples. Let us hope the
lesson is soon learned and that loving relationships in all their forms are
accorded the same dignity and respect.
JONATHAN DEITRICH
proposed in California. Domestic Partners Effort To Get First Statewide Test, MILWAUKEE J.,
Feb. 14, 1994, at A4.
237. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
238. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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